In his famous essay "The Transition from an Aristotelean to a Galilean
Way of Thinking in Biology and Psychology" (LEWIN 1931), Kurt LEWIN recommends
two necessary steps for psychological research which are connected with each other
in science theory:
- the transition from non-personal to field theoretical (situational, relational)
applications;
- the transition from a character centered to a function centered explanation of
psychic phenonema.
In my lecture I pursue the question of whether or not FREUD and his followers, and
also whether LEWIN himself and his school, have completed this transition. In 1934
J.F. BROWN, a student of LEWIN, wrote that "FREUD'S psychoanalysis fulfills
some of the criteria for field theory, some for class theory, and with regard to
some criteria is a mixture of the two types of theory." In regarding the
difference between his topological psychology and psychoanalysis, LEWIN himself
was of the opinion that the former understands all occurrences as emerging out of
the totality of the life space, and accordingly, considers the person and the environment,
whereas psychoanalysis concerns itself primarily with the person. METZGER was even
more radical on this point. Although FREUD was the first to observe a person no
longer as a psychological aggregate, but rather as a system, his concepts remain,
nonetheless, solipsistic because for him "the borders of the dynamic system
man were the same as the borders of the organism".
The psychoanalyst RICHTER also came to the conclusion that FREUD's developmental
teachings rest on an individualistic model of thought, one related to the cognitive
model of organ medicine. This is unreasonable in the psychological realm of human
beings, as they are necessarily involved primarily with other human beings, not
predominantly with biochemical or biophysical spheres.
One can then say: While with FREUD the therapeutic treatment rests on relational
and dialogical methods, his theory contains building blocks impressed with monopersonal
concepts.
Some disciples of FREUD have, nonetheless, overcome this inconsistency between theory
and practice by using a relational model. I would like to mention just two directions:
- the narrative-linguistic direction, which employs narrative and linguistic
theories in the analytical discussion;
- the dramaturgical direction (for example, Horst Eberhard RICHTER) which
uses concepts of scenes, roles, etc. in order to represent the relationship of the
patient to the therapist and to his or her environment.
Also to be mentioned here:
- The french psychoanalysts Madelaine and Willy BARANGER, working in Argentina,
who view the patient and the therapist as complementary pair and propose to described
it with the field model.
- The recommendation from Giancarlo TROMBINI, professor for clinical psychology
in Bologna, who, in following the example of METZGER, describes the organization
of the analytical pair by using the concept of the step structure and the ring structure,
and examines the conditions and function of such structures.
In my lecture I consider finally the question of whether LEWIN consequently applied
the field-theoretical approach in his own psychology. My opinion is that neither
LEWIN nor FREUD satisfactorily solved the relationship between theory and practice.
Certainly, his theory contains relational character, but nonetheless, his method
lacks in dialogical character.
These inadequacies spring from different grounds:
1.) because the experience of the test subject is sometimes not thematized by the
tester,
2.) because the structure of the field in the experimental situation does not allow
the deeper levels of the person to be reached.
In regards to point one: let me cite the well know work of Bluma ZEIGARNIK as well
as her necessary corrector Erika JUNKER, that the better remembering is not determined
by not-being-finished but rather by not-being-right. In regards to this, I would
like to note that the emphasis of the theory was here displaced too far along the
object pole (the task structure) in the whole field, with the consequence that the
interest in the person slipped into the background; in general, theory was given
too much weight to the debit of the dialogical method.
In regards to point two: in comparison, the application of the field theory seems
to have been completely achieved in another investigation from this research series
-- that is in the work of Tamara DEMBO on anger. Here all of the variables of the
field are examined: those related to the task, those related to the person and those
related to the person-environment relation. The method includes not only the observations
of behaviour but also the conversation with the test subject. Only then could important
phenomena be brought to light such as: level of aspiration, substitution, going
out of the field, reality layers, etc. The experimental situation is not, however,
well suited to reaching the deep layers of the person, nor to really portraying
the concrete structure of the psychic person with its inner dynamic facts, as LEWIN
claims in his methodological essay. In my research of the phenomenal Ego (GALLI
1980, 1982), I was able to confirm--in opposition to LEWIN's opinion--that the test
subject can not open up in the experimental situation in order to serve the research
goals of the tester.
LEWIN postulated the necessity in psychology to cross over from an explanation of
character (Wesenserklärung) to a function centered explanation. For example,
he found the concept of the "terrible two's" (stubborn age) and also the
psychoanalytical notions of drives lacking in that they have the character of an
Aristotelean explanation of character and in essence are achieved through the abstract
selection of similarities of a group of relatively common occurences. The abstractly
defined class is seen as the essence, and seen as apt to precisely explaining the
behaviour of the individual entity.
In the area of Gestalt theory character explanations were taken over by function
centered explanations, for example, in the work by Tamara DEMBO which was already
mentioned, and in the investigation of early childhood defiance done by Lilly KEMMLER,
a student of METZGER. With the aid of field theoretical applications, KEMMLER was
able to avoid the character explanation and explain the dynamic of defiance by identifying
the person and environmental factors and their function in the whole situation.
There are also examples for function centered explanations gaining prominence in
contemporary psychoanalysis. I am limiting myself here to the transference phenomen.
Although FREUD analyzed yet purely from monopersonal perspective, the dramaturgical
as well as the narrative-linguistic post-Freudian direction of psychoanalysis offer
a completely different conception. In following both of these directions, the roles
of the two participants, participating patient and therapist, are built on the here
and now of the analytical situation. The question is no longer: why does the patient
behave so or so, why does he say this or that?, but rather, why does he behave so
with the therapist, or, why does he tell that to the therapist?
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